The paper proposes an approach to light-weight 
Introduction
Component-based software development (CBSD) has been widely applied in safety-critical applications, such as medical instruments, communication and aviation systems. These systems must satisfy some critical properties. It is convinced that the components with comprehensive highly dependable characteristics will be the basis of high confidence software engineering, and the methodology for integrating these components should be studied to obtain the high assurance systems. It will require the formal specification of component, interface, and architecture framework. The corresponding analysis and verification techniques around the safety and reliability properties are also essential. There have been some related works, such as ArchWare project [1] , SAVEComp [2] , Cadena [3] , etc.
Our approach uses component model in UML 2.0 superstructure [4] as the basis of describing safety critical systems. To depict the rigorous context and temporal constraints of interface usage, the light-weight formal specification is attached to component integration through defining interface protocol state machine and its semantics model, namely contract automata. The notions of stateful and stateless are introduced into interfaces to distinguish the specialties of operations. Then the various kinds of essential consistencies are studied from static, dynamic and refinement perspectives, in which system environments are defined in an optimistical approach. The method has been investigated in analyzing SAFE-II, a lifesaving system of spaceship.
Component Model and Static Contract
For clarity, u! and u? can be used for distinguishing provided and required interfaces respectively. A component (I P , I R , P, R, G) includes the provided and required interface set I P and I R , a port name set P . Relation R maps ports to interfaces, and the component diagram G describes the internal view of the component. An assembly connector (u!, v?) links a provided interface with a required interface. A provided delegation connector (p, u!) or required delegation connector (v?, p) shows how a signal that arrives at a port p is forwarded to the interfaces on the other side of p for handling. Fig.1 presents an example composite component of fault-detecting in SAFE-II, and (AO2!, EI?), (p4, EO!), (AI1?, p1) are the assembly, provided and required delegation connectors respectively.
In a component diagram G = (V, F, E), set F includes at most one element which is the parent of all components in set V . E = (N A , N Dp , N Dr ) consists of three sets of assembly, provided and required delegation connectors. Each component in V may have its own sub-component diagram from which the hierarchical structure is formed.
The connected interfaces should satisfy some static consistencies to ensure correctly mapping, which can be verified via type checking. 
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If p appears in the required delegation connectors, then for all
They are described as the 2nd and 3rd static consistencies, which specify that the interfaces should implement at least all services which are delegated to them.
Dynamic Contract and Composition
Safety critical systems have rigorous requirements in the temporal properties of interface operator usage, which will be described by dynamic contract. At the same time, there are some operations which may work at any time, not only in the specific states. Therefore, operations will be marked with stateful or stateless. We define the Interface Protocol State Machine (IPSM) to depict dynamic contract of stateful interface operations. IPSM is composed of the states and transitions, which are labelled by the required or provided interface operations. States are classified into AN D, OR and BASIC states as in UML statecharts [4] . f (o) = true if interface operator o appears in some transition label, otherwise f (o) = f alse. Two complemented operations may become a stateless internal operation after composition.
Interleaving semantics is considered for AN D states. An IPSM must locate in a configuration at any time. Then the resulted transition model generated from IPSM A is named contract automaton, denoted as Contr(A), whose states are configurations of IPSM, and transitions are labelled with the provided, required or internal operations. Function f is also included to indicates that each operation is stateful or stateless. It can be found that a contract automaton is somewhat similar to an interface automaton [5] .
If the intersection of the provided operation set of two contract automata A and B is empty, they are composable, and the product C = A ⊗ B is also a contract automaton. When operation q? is included in A or B, and q! appears in the other one, q is placed in set share(A, B) . In our composition, the stateless provided operations in share(A, B) are reserved in A⊗B and can be still invoked by other components, which is different from interface automata. It can be deduced that ⊗ is commutative and associative.
A state of A ⊗ B is illegal if ∃q ∈ share(A, B) , q? appears in one outward transition from current state in A or B, but q! can not be offered in the other automaton simultaneously. A nonempty contract automaton E is a legal environment of contract automaton A if E has all the provided operations that A requires, and there are no reachable illegal states in A ⊗ E. Then, the consistency of dynamic contract can be defined and verified in an optimistic approach:
A component diagram (V, F, E) is consistent if f the contract automata of any two components in V are composable, and there exists a legal environment for ⊗V (the product of contract automata of all components in V ).
Component Refinement and Future Works
In a system design of top-down style, when a composite component is decomposed into sub-components, the IPSM M of the composite component should also be decomposed into M i , which are IPSMs of sub-components. The composition of M i should be consistent with M . It implies that Contr(M ) ⊗Contr(M i ) must be satisfied, where is the well-defined refinement relation.
When constructing the system by integrating the existing components in a bottom-up approach, the contract automaton A of the resulted composite component can be obtained by computing the product of contract automata A i of each existent component. If the IPSM M has been specified for the composite component in design stage, A should be consistent with the contract automaton of M , i.e.
Contr(M ) A, where A = ⊗A i
Around these formal specifications, model checking of component-based safety critical systems is being studied, especially combined with compositional reasoning to improve the scalability. Timing constraints are unavoidable in safety-critical systems (e.g. SAFE-II). How to introduce time description and related performance interfaces into verification will be further studied.
